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Abstract—In evolved Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service
(eMBMS), service continuity enables users move from one cell to
another without interrupting eMBMS service. Unlike traditional
handover in unicast transmission, a UE can receive eMBMS
service in either unicast or multicast mode. In this paper, we
point out a new handover failure problem in eMBMS due to
the miss of rekeying information. We first take a close look at
the new handover scenarios. We then investigate the problem by
using comprehensive mathematical models. Our models provide
insights on the new handover problem and introduce theoretical
guidelines for mobile operators to design and optimize their net-
works without wide deployment to save cost and time. Moreover,
we propose a solution to combat against the handover failure.
Both the simulation and analytical results demonstrate that the
impacts of the eMBMS handover failure are reduced significantly.
In this paper, we present a systematic way to investigate the
handover failure problem in eMBMS.
Index Terms—mobility, eMBMS handover failure, multicast,
performance analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, more and more people are switching fromwatching traditional TV to streaming video on mobile
devices. Live streaming apps, such as YouTube Live, Facebook
Live, Verizon Go90, attract millions of users. Besides, the
number of concurrent live viewers could be huge. For example,
on the 3rd U.S. presidential debates in 2016, YouTube Live
drew 1.7 million peak concurrent live viewers. The 2016
Super Bowl got 111.9 million viewers with an average of 3.96
million viewers on the live streaming [1].
Long-Term Evolution (LTE) Broadcast, also known
as evolved Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (eM-
BMS) [2], was proposed to meet the demand for broadcasting
services. LTE Broadcast delivers the same content to a large
number of devices at the same time, which significantly
reduces transmission cost and increases efficiency of the
network. This makes it ideal for live streaming services. In
June 2015, BBC R&D and EE demonstrated LTE Broadcast
during the FA Cup final in the U.K. In Oct. 2015, Verizon
commercially launched Go90 eMBMS service [3]. Verizon
customers can purchase a full season of NBA League Pass
for USD 99.50 through Go90.
eMBMS enables user mobility by using service continu-
ity feature [2], [4]. Specifically, users with hand-held User
Equipment (UE) terminals can enjoy eMBMS services while
moving within an MBMS Single Frequency Network (MBSFN)
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areas, and MBSFN service areas.
service area as shown in Fig. 1. An MBSFN service area
usually consists of one or more MBSFN areas, in which a set
of evolved NodeBs (eNBs) uses the same resource block to
deliver eMBMS services in a time-synchronized manner. In the
service area, therefore, users are able to move (handover) from
one cell (serving eNB) to another (target eNB) without inter-
rupting the MBMS service. However, different from unicast
transmission which is used in RRC Connected state only, a UE
can receive eMBMS services in either RRC Connected state
or RRC Idle state [4]. Due to this characteristic, in this paper,
we point out an eMBMS service continuity failure problem,
referred to as eMBMS Handover Failure1.
The eMBMS Handover Failure problem2 is caused mainly
because of missing the rekeying information. In particular, data
security is one of the essential requirements for eMBMS. To
prevent unauthorized users from accessing eMBMS contents,
3GPP introduces Key Management Mechanism (KMM) [5].
Its basic idea is to maintain a multicast group, in which only
UEs belonged to the same group can receive the multicast
data [6]. When a member joins/leaves the group, a group key
needs to be updated to add/revoke the member. The process is
referred to as rekeying. As a result, the users holding the old
keys are unable to access the subsequent contents.
Given the fact that users with old keys are unable to access
subsequent eMBMS contents, any key material missing may
cause encryption/ciphering mismatch, leading to the eMBMS
handover failure. In unicast transmission, if any message fails
to be transmitted, a re-transmission attempt can be conducted
when a UE stays in RRC Connected state. In eMBMS, a UE
can receive eMBMS service in RRC Idle state in which no
dedicated network resource is maintained between the UE and
the core network. In other words, there is no ACK mechanism
to confirm the messages received. Also, when a UE receives
eMBMS service in RRC Connected state, the updated key
material is unicast to every UE joined the eMBMS services
over UDP, in which there is no retransmission. The core
1Please note that there is no handover process when a UE is in RRC Idle
state. We use the handover to denote the moving behavior across cells.
2For simplicity, we simply call it as Handover Failure problem in rest of
the paper.
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network will still update the group key even if some of the
UEs do not receive the rekeying information correctly [4], [5].
Therefore, those UEs missing the rekeying information will not
be able to derive new keys. Their rekeying procedure will be
stopped, which results in Handover Failure (to be detailed in
Section III).
Mobility management is a major challenge in cellular
networks. Extensive studies [7]–[15] have been conducted to
enhance mobility performance as well as to reduce handover
failure. However, these studies were not tailored to eMBMS
mobility and handover scenario, which cannot be applied to
enhance eMBMS service continuity directly. In our earlier
work [16], we have addressed the impacts of rekeying interval
on eMBMS system performance and the revenue loss of
content providers. However, eMBMS handover scenario was
ignored.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to address
the service continuity problem in eMBMS caused by missing
rekeying information. In this paper, we first take a close look
at the LTE mobility management mechanism and eMBMS
KMM. When eMBMS UEs are in RRC Connected state,
deploying X2 interface may reduce handover failure. However,
the X2 interface suffers from the following deployment issues.
Initially the X2 interface was rarely activated in real-world
LTE environments [17]. Although this is starting to change,
supporting X2 handover is not easy because of possible
scalability and instability issues [18]. Also, configuring X2
gateway needs to upgrade all eNBs to Release 12 of the
standards, which is costly and time-consuming. To protect the
investments made in old equipment, cellular operators usually
evolve slowly and will not upgrade to a new release imme-
diately. These issues have been an obstacle standing in the
way of applying X2 handover in commercial networks [18].
Even though X2 interface is deployed, it may be temporarily
unavailable due to no enough bandwidth available in X2
interface or network failure. Also, X2 interface does not help
for eMBMS UEs being in RRC Idle state.
So, what is the impact of adding an X2 interface for
eMBMS handover on the network performance? Are there any
other factors to diminish eMBMS service continuity failure
when a UE is in RRC Idle state? For these issues, we propose
a set of analytical models to characterize the eMBMS mobility
performance. Based on the analytical models, we have the
following insights which are often difficult to obtain without
detailed mathematical analysis. We find out that not only X2
interface has impact on handover failure. Other factors, such
as session life time, cell residence time, and UE arrival rate,
also play some roles. Instead of randomly tuning those factors,
based on our findings, we provide theoretical guidelines for
operators to design and optimize their networks for mobile
eMBMS services. We also analyze the handover failure when
there is no X2 interface available for eMBMS handover, i.e.,
mobility with S1 interface. We have also conducted extensive
simulations by using ns2 to validate our mathematical models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces background. Section III defines the problem. Sec-
tion IV reviews the related work. Challenges and our con-
tributions are delineated in Section V. The analytical model
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Fig. 2: Intra-E-UTRAN mobility with X2 interface support -
message flow.
is presented in Section VI, followed by the numerical results
discussed in Section VII. Guidelines for operators then are
presented in Section VIII. Section IX summaries this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, backgrounds on LTE mobility manage-
ment [19] and eMBMS KMM [2], [5], [20] are reviewed in
Sections II-A and II-B, respectively.
A. LTE Mobility Management
In this paper, we mainly focus on intra-Evolved Universal
Terrestrial Radio Access Network (intra-E-UTRAN) active
mode mobility which can be categorized as: (a) mobility with
X2 support, and (b) mobility without X2 support. They are
discussed in the following sessions.
1) Mobility with X2 Support: X2 interface is an interface
between eNBs and is used to transmit packets between the
eNBs. With the support of X2 interface between source eNB
and target eNB, the source eNB is able to forward all downlink
Packet Data Units (PDUs) buffered in the Radio Link Control
(RLC) buffer upon receiving the Handover Request ACK
message. By doing this, packet loss during handover procedure
may be reduced. Fig. 2 shows the message flows of the
handover procedure defined in 3GPP [21] with X2 interface:
• Step 1: Once the source eNB makes the handover deci-
sion, it issues Handover Request message to the target
eNB.
• Step 2: After all needed resources are allocated, the target
eNB answers with the Handover Request ACK message.
• Step 3: Upon receiving the Handover Request ACK
message, the source eNB forwards all the buffered data
to the target eNB directly over the X2 interface.
• Step 4: The source eNB forwards the Handover Com-
mand message which is encapsulated in the Handover
Request ACK message in Step 2 to the UE.
• Step 5: Once the UE is synchronized with the target eNB,
it sends the Handover Confirm message triggering the
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Fig. 3: Intra-E-UTRAN mobility without X2 interface support
(also called mobility with S1 interface) - message flow.
Path Switch procedure. This procedure informs Mobility
Management Entity (MME) that an intra E-UTRAN
handover is successfully completed via X2 interface.
• Step 6: Finally, the radio resources in the Source eNB
allocated to the UE are released.
2) Mobility without X2 Support (also called mobility using
S1 interface): The main principle of this case is very similar to
that in the previous one. The major difference is the absence of
the X2 interface. Instead, S1 interface is used for the handover
procedure as illustrated in Fig. 3. As a consequence, MME
acts as a relay for signaling messages between the source and
target eNBs. Therefore, data forwarding procedure in Step 3
in Fig. 2 is not conducted here. Hence, if there are RLC PDUs
buffered in the source eNB, all of them will be lost when the
handover is performed.
3) Summary: In conclusion, the RLC PDUs buffered at the
source eNB may be lost. In practical, it may happen because
X2 interface is not available between eNBs.
B. Security of Evolved Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Ser-
vice (eMBMS)
The eMBMS KMM architecture defined in 3GPP [5]
consists of Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF), Broad-
cast/Multicast Service Center (BM-SC), content provider, eM-
BMS gateway, and UEs, as shown in Fig. 4. More precisely,
BSF is a part of the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)
which establishes shared secret between UEs and BM-SC. The
BM-SC acts as an entry point for content delivery services,
and forwards the broadcast/multicast packets to the eMBMS
gateway from the content provider. BSF, BM-SC, and eMBMS
gateway are within Core Network (CN).
In order to protect eMBMS data, 3GPP defined a set of four
security keys in eMBMS KMM [2], [5], which are MBMS
Request Key (MRK), MBMS Service Key (MSK), MBMS
Traffic Key (MTK), and MBMS User Key (MUK). MRK is
mainly used for authentication. MUK secures the distribution
of MSK, while MSK is used to protect a certain eMBMS
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Fig. 4: A simplified example of eMBMS architecture.
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eMBMS data.
session and the transmission of MTK. MTK is responsible to
encrypt and to decrypt eMBMS traffic. In short, MUK, MSK,
and MTK are used to protect data (see their relationship in
Fig. 5). Here, {MSK1, MSK2, · · · , MSKn} are a sequence of
keys in terms of time. For example, MSK1 is the previous
key of MSK2. Similarly, MTK11 is the previous key of
MTK12. For eMBMS service group 1 and group 2 in Fig. 4,
different key sets are distributed to them, respectively. For
example, {MSK11,MSK12, · · · ,MSK1n} are for group 1 and
{MSK21,MSK22, · · · ,MSK2n} are for group 2. For the sake of
simplicity, we did not use the notation MSK1 and MSK2 to
indicate the keys for the two groups in the paper.
During an eMBMS service session, MSK/MTK is (are)
updated (referred to as rekeying in this paper) when one of
the following events happens: (a) Event 1: a new UE joins
the eMBMS session, (b) Event 2: a joined UE leaves the
eMBMS session, (c) Event 3: the timer of MSK expires, and
(d) Event 4: the timer of MTK expires. In order to update
MSK/MTK, User Service Join procedure (for Event 1), User
Service Leave procedure (for Event 2), MSK Periodic Update
procedure (for Event 3), or MTK Periodic Update procedure
(for Event 4) are carried out [2], [5], [22].
Here, we show a simplified example of User Service Join
procedure for Event 1 in Fig. 6, where UE{1...n} denote the
UEs which have already joined the service, and UEn+1 is a
new UE.
• Step 1: The new UE, UEn+1, first sends a service join
request to the BM-SC. The BM-SC then will ask UEn+1
to initiate the bootstrap authentication procedure with the
BSF.
• Step 2: The UEn+1 performs the bootstrapping authenti-
cation procedure with the BSF and derives its MRKn+1
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Fig. 6: A new UE joins an eMBMS user service - message
flow.
and MUKn+1.
• Step 3: After the UEn+1 has derived MRKn+1 and
MUKn+1, it authenticates itself with the BM-SC using
the MRKn+1.
• Step 4: The BM-SC generates a new MSK, MSKnew, and
unicasts MIKEY message [23] over UDP to transport
the MSKnew to every UE that has joined the service
by Dedicated Control Channel (DCCH) and Dedicated
Traffic Channel (DTCH) [4], [5]. The message sent to
UEk (k ∈ [1, n]) is protected by the corresponding
MUKk.
• Step 5: The BM-SC generates a new MTK, MTKnew,
encrypted by MSKnew, and multicasts it over UDP to
every UE that has joined the service by MBMS point-to-
multipoint Control Channel (MCCH) and MBMS point-
to-multipoint Traffic Channel (MTCH) [4], [5].
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Due to the requirements of charging and content protection,
eMBMS KMM has to guarantee forward security3. That is,
a UE, which is revoked from the eMBMS service at time
t, will not be able to access the encrypted content after
time t. A formal definition of forward security is given in
Definition 1 [16].
Definition 1. (Forward security) Forward security is provided
if for any set Rt ⊂ UE, where Rt is a set of revoked
UEs before time t. It is computationally infeasible for the
UEs from Rt working together to get any information about
Kt′ (t′ ≥ t), even when previous security keys {K1, · · · ,Kt−1}
are available.
In KMM, security key(s) (we use K to denote either MSK
or MTK, etc.) is/are updated to provide forward security. In
other words, the security key Ki is evolved if and only if
one knows the previous key, i.e., Ki ⇒ Ki+1 and Ki ; Kj
(i ≥ 1, j ≥ i + 2). The key evolvement (say from Ki to Kj)
will fail if any key Kk (i < k < j) is missing. In eMBMS,
the consequence of key evolvement failure is that the UE will
not be able to decrypt the eMBMS content encrypted by the
new key Kj . The eMBMS service is thus interrupted from
3KMM provides both forward security and backward security. However,
backward security is out of the scope of this paper.
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UE’s perspective. Next, we will use an example to explain the
eMBMS handover failure caused by key missing.
As shown in Fig. 7, UEs may move between eNBs within
an MBSFN service area. Depending on network conditions4,
RLC PDUs may be buffered in the eNB’s buffer for a short
period of time [24]. When a UE moves from cell A to cell C,
eNB A will forward buffered RLC PDUs to eNB C via the
X2 interface between them, assuming eNB A and eNB C are
connected by X2 interface. Whereas, if the UE moves from
cell A to cell B where X2 interface is not available between
the two eNBs, the RLC PDUs buffered in eNB A may be
lost (to be detailed in the next paragraph). The lost data will
lead to eMBMS handover failure if the rekeying information
happens to be in it.
To be more specific, the rekeying information may be lost
in the following two cases. First, MSKnew may be lost due to
UDP transmission. Recall that in Step 4 in Fig. 6, the updated
MSKnew is unicast in MIKEY message to every UE joined
the eMBMS services over UDP [4], [5]. There is no ACK
to confirm that the UEs have received the updated MSKnew
correctly [5]. Second, MTKnew may be lost during multicast
transmission. In Step 5 in Fig. 6, the MTKnew is multicast to
every UE joined the service over UDP [4], [5]. A UE will not
send an error message to the BM-SC because of not receiving
an MTK message [5]. The eMBMS KMM will still update
security keys even if some UEs do not receive the rekeying
information correctly.
As a conclusion, missing MTKnew will cause that the UEs
cannot decrypt current eMBMS content. In addition, missing
MSKnew will lead to that the UEs cannot obtain MTKnew
encrypted by the MSKnew (see Step 5 in Fig. 6). Therefore,
handover failure will happen if the MIKEY message happens
to be in the lost data which is not forwarded from the serving
eNB to the target eNB.
IV. RELATED WORK
Approaches aimed to enhance mobility performance have
been intensive studied [8]–[16]. In the case of small cells,
due to the coverage constrains of small cells, handovers in
dense small cells are frequent. The authors in [8] modeled and
analyzed the handover failure problem in small cell networks.
4Generally speaking, good/bad network condition leads to less/more RLC
PDUs buffered in eNBs.
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A closed-form expression of the handover failure probability
is characterized, which provides key insights into the mobility
management problem. The work [9] made theoretical anal-
ysis on cross-tier handover in small cell networks based on
stochastic geometry approach. The analytical results provide
fundamental supports to improve mobility management in
small cell networks. The authors in [10] proposed a novel local
anchor-based architecture to reduce handover failure in small
cells. The authors also derived closed-form expressions of key
handover metrics to evaluate the proposed schemes. The au-
thors in [11] studied inter-beam handover scheme for mmWave
mobile communication systems. Due to the characteristic of
narrow beams, the inter-beam handover is frequent, leading
to handover failure and signaling overhead. The proposed
scheme decreases handover failure rate and reduces signaling
overhead significantly. The authors of [25] proposed a delay
timer algorithm to reduce handover cost. An analytical model
was derived to study the effects of traffic and user mobility
on system performance, which can help cellular operators to
plan network more efficiently.
When a UE quickly passes through cells, frequent handovers
may lead to serious handover failures. The authors of [12]
proposed a multi-RAT soft handover approach to enhance
wireless communications on high-speed trains. They showed
through detailed analysis that the proposed approach can
effectively improve the handover performance in the high-
speed train scenario. Reference [13] introduced a novel group
in-network handover procedure, which can aggregate similar
in-network handover procedures in the core network, and
reduce both time and signaling cost during handover. The
authors of [14] proposed a set of new handover procedures
considering two antennas on the top of a train. The procedure
optimizes the utilization of the two antennas and decreases the
overhead. It also improves the QoS of the users. Both handover
failure probability and communication interruption probability
are reduced.
However, none of the above studies [8]–[14] considered
the eMBMS handover failure problem due to key update, as
discussed in Section III. Perhaps, the closest work to ours
was studied in [15] that the impacts of key updates on han-
dover management are taken into consideration. The authors
addressed the vulnerability of handover key management and
pointed out that periodic updates of the root key are an integral
part of handover key management. They then proposed an
analytical model to determine an optimal rekey interval to
minimize the signaling load. However, handover failure due
to key missing was not discussed. In our recent work [16], we
introduce that frequent rekeying may lead to eMBMS service
failure. However, eMBMS mobility/handover scenario was not
considered.
V. CHALLENGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In this section, we summarize the challenges and delineate
our contributions.
A. Challenges
1) The RLC PDUs buffered at the source eNB may be
lost if X2 interface is not available temporarily or per-
manently between eNBs. The reasons could be various,
such as no enough bandwidth available in X2 interface
for eMBMS service, network equipment failure, using
legacy network equipment, or simply from the fact that
the operator is not willing to deploy X2 connectivity
between eNBs due to cost concerns.
2) In eMBMS, the core network will still update the group
key even if some of the UEs do not receive the rekeying
information correctly. Therefore, those UEs missing the
rekeying information will not be able to derive new keys.
Their rekeying procedure will be stopped, which results
in eMBMS handover failure.
3) The number of UEs in an eMBMS multicast group is
usually much more than that in other wireless networks.
Besides, in eMBMS, UEs may conduct handovers be-
tween eNBs, and enter/exit the eMBMS service ran-
domly and frequently.
B. Contributions
Although eMBMS has been standardized by 3GPP, it is still
in trial in most countries. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to identify the eMBMS handover failure problem
caused by eMBMS KMM when a UE performs handover using
the legacy S1 interface. As aforementioned discussion, adding
X2 interface between eNBs is a straightforward way to solve
the problem. In doing so, the following two cases should be
taken into consideration by cellular operators.
• Case 1: As discussed in Section I, supporting X2 han-
dover is not easy because of possible scalability and
instability issues [18]. Various other issues have also
been an obstacle standing in the way of applying X2
handover in commercial networks. Should a cellular
operator deploy X2 interface in its existing network? If
yes, should a cellular operator deploy X2 interface in the
whole network or just in some parts of the network? In
particular, what is the impact of X2 interface on network
performance in terms of UE handover?
• Case 2: For an existing network, deploying X2 interfaces
within a short period of time is not an easy task. For
a legacy network with S1 interface only, are there other
ways to diminish the impact of handover failure without
X2 interface?
Our contributions include:
1) We propose analytical models to answer the questions
in Case 1 in Section VI. Based on our analysis, we find
out that not only X2 interface has impact on eMBMS
handover failure, other factors such as session life time,
cell residence time, and UE arrival rate, also play some
roles.
2) We propose a solution for Case 2 in Section VIII. If
an operator cannot deploy X2 interface due to various
reasons, we still can deal with the bursty UE arrivals by
adjusting rekeying rate.
3) We provide theoretical guidelines for operators to design
and optimize their networks for mobile eMBMS services
in Section VIII. We also present a systematic way to
investigate the handover failure problem in eMBMS.
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TABLE I: List of Parameters
Notation Unit Description
ts s Life time of a session
tcr s Cell residence time
tI , tI l s Rekey time interval (spec, ours)
tr, tr l s Time interval between the UE hands over to next eNB and the first rekeying operation occurs
(spec, ours)
tb s Data buffered time interval
te s Time interval between the new session starts and the first handover take place
1
µs
, 1µcr ,
1
µb
s Mean value of ts, tcr, tb
λs 1/s UE arrival rate in a session
λr 1/s Rekeying rate
pX2 The probability of existing an X2 interface between eNBs/HeNBs
ph eMBMS handover failure probability
pc The probability of a UE’s session is completed w/o encountering any failure
pnc The probability of a UE’s session that encounters failure(s)
pf , pf l The probability of rekeying information lost during an S1 handover (spec, ours)
pI l The probability mass function (pmf) of prolonged rekeying operation
ps The probability of successful handover
fs, fcr, fb, fe pdf of ts, tcr, tb, te
fI , fI l, fr, fr l pdf of tI , tI l, tr, tr l
Fb, FI , FI l CDF of tb, tI , tI l
VI. ANALYTICAL MODEL
In this section, novel analytical models are proposed to
analyze the impacts of replacing S1 interface with X2 interface
in legacy networks. More specifically, a set of performance
metrics are proposed and modeled to evaluate the network
performance. With the analytical models, cellular operators
can quickly obtain the performance for the aforementioned
Case 1 to save deployment cost and time. The operators thus
are able to design and optimize their networks by using the
metrics and analytical models without wide deployment which
is too costly and time-consuming. In the analytical models,
common properties of the handover failure are addressed. We
then propose a solution for Case 2 to diminish the impact
of S1 interface on handover failure in eMBMS services in
Section VIII.
In the analytical models, we use the commonly used as-
sumptions in cellular networks that both session holding time
ts and cell residence time tcr are assumed to be exponential
distributed [16], [26]–[28], with mean value 1µs and
1
µcr
, and
probability density function (pdf) fs(t) and fcr(t), respec-
tively. During a session holding time ts, a UE will visit K
cells (with cell residence time tcri in i
th cell). Because the
data for a UE will be buffered at current serving eNB for
a short period of time, we assume that the time is tb, with
mean 1µb and pdf fb(t). The parameters used in the analysis
are listed in Table I.
A. Modeling of eMBMS Handover Failure Probability
First, we are interested in the probability, ph, that rekeying
information is lost during a handover, which is referred to as
handover failure for simplicity in this study. The handover fail-
ure probability is one of the most important metrics to evaluate
network performance in cellular networks. It is closely related
to users’ Quality of Experience (QoE), especially for the users
with high mobility.
Recall that the rekeying information will be lost during a
handover if both the rekeying information is in the buffer of
serving eNB and there is no X2 interface between the serving
eNB and the target eNB. Hence,
ph = pf (1− pX2), (1)
where pf denotes the probability of missing rekeying infor-
mation during an S1-based handover (without X2 interface),
and pX2 is the probability that X2 interface exists between the
serving eNB and the target eNB.
As shown in Fig. 8, tI denotes the time interval between
two rekeying operations of MSK/MTK with pdf, fI(t), and
cumulative distribution function (CDF), FI(t). Let tr (tr < tI )
denote the time interval between the UE performing handover
and the arrival of next rekeying information. It is easy to know
that pf equals to that at least one rekeying information is
included in the buffer as discussed in Section III. Therefore,
we have:
pf = Pr{tb > tr} =
∫ ∞
tb=0
∫ tb
t=0
fb(tb)fr(t)dtdtb, (2)
where fr(t) is the pdf of tr. According to the Excess Life
Theorem [29], we derive fr(t) as:
fr(t) = λr
∫ ∞
s=t
fI(s)ds = λre
−λrt, (3)
where λr is the rekey rate. Therefore, from Eq. (3), Eq. (2) is
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Fig. 8: Relationship between rekeying and buffered data lost.
rewritten as:
pf =
∫ ∞
tb=0
∫ tb
t=0
fb(tb)λre
−λrtdtdtb
=
∫ ∞
tb=0
fb(tb)(1− e−λrtb)dtb = 1− f∗b (λr). (4)
Since the buffered time, tb, is assumed to be general
distribution, here we drive pf and ph using three distributions
as examples.
Gamma Distribution: The CDF of Gamma distribution,
Gamma(k, 1kµb ), is Fb(tb) =
1
Γ(k)γ(k, kµbtb). Also, the
Laplace transform of the Gamma pdf is f∗b (s) = (1+
s
kµb
)−k.
Hence, pf is rewritten as pf = 1 −
(
1 + λrkµb
)−k
= 1 −(
kµb
kµb+λr
)k
, and we then rewrite Eq. (1) as ph =
[
1 −(
kµb
kµb+λr
)k](
1− pX2
)
.
Erlang Distribution: The Laplace transform of Erlang dis-
tribution, Erlang(k, µb), is given as f∗b (s) = (
µb
µb+s
)k. Hence,
pf is rewritten as pf = 1 −
(
µb
µb+λr
)k
, and we then rewrite
Eq. (1) as ph =
[
1−
(
µb
µb+λr
)k](
1− pX2
)
.
Exponential Distribution: The CDF of Exponential distri-
bution, Exp(µb), is Fb(tb) = 1 − e−µbtb , and the Laplace
transform of the exponential pdf is f∗b (s) =
µb
µb+s
. Hence, pf
is rewritten as pf = λrµb+λr , and we then rewrite Eq. (1) as
ph =
[
λr
µb+λr
](
1− pX2
)
.
pf and ph are very important factors to model the perfor-
mance metrics in this study. We have derived pf and ph based
on Gamma distribution, Erlang distribution, and Exponential
distribution, respectively. In the following sections, we will
use Gamma distribution as an example for pf and ph, that is,
pf = 1−
(
kµb
kµb+λr
)k
and ph =
[
1−
(
kµb
kµb+λr
)k](
1− pX2
)
.
The reasons are twofold. One is due to the page limit. The
other reason is that the distribution of any positive random
variable can be approximated by a combination of Gamma
distribution as stated in Lemma 3.9 in [30].
B. Modeling of eMBMS Session Failure Probability
The eMBMS session failure probability, pnc, denotes the
probability that a UE’s eMBMS service session is forced to
be terminated5. It is used to evaluate the QoE of eMBMS
5Generally, a session may be terminated by various reasons. In this study,
we mainly focus on the termination because there is no X2 interface.
time
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Fig. 9: Timing diagram for the new session arrival and the cell
crossing.
users.
We first derive pc = 1− pnc, the probability that a session
completes successfully (without handover failures):
pc =
∞∑
k=0
Pr{visit k cells}
× Pr{session completed successfully|visit k cells}
=
∞∑
k=0
Pr{K = k|Ts = ts} · pks , (5)
where ps is the probability of successful handover with X2
interface. Recall that in such conditions, rekeying information
will not be lost during the handover due to the data forwarding
via X2 interface. We have:
ps = 1− ph = f∗b (λr) + pX2 − f∗b (λr) · pX2. (6)
Let Pr{K = k|Ts = ts} be the probability that a UE visits
k (k ≥ 1) cells within the session. In each cell, UE stays
for a time interval, tcr, which is assumed to be exponentially
distributed with Laplace transform f∗cr(s) =
µcr
µcr+s
. As shown
in Fig. 9, it is easy to know that Pr{K = k|Ts = ts} can be
denoted as:
Pr{K = k|Ts = ts}
= Pr{te + tcr1 + tcr2 + · · ·+ tcrk−1 < ts ≤
te + tcr1 + tcr2 + · · ·+ tcrk}
=
∫ ∞
te=0
∫ ∞
tcr1=0
· · ·
∫ ∞
tcrk=0
∫ te+tcr1+···+tcrk
t=te+tcr1+···+tcrk−1
fs(t)fe(te)fcr(tcr1)fcr(tcr2) . . . fcr(tcrk)dtdtcrk . . . dtcr1dte
=
∫ ∞
te=0
∫ ∞
tcr1=0
· · ·
∫ ∞
tcrk=0
∫ te+tcr1+···+tcrk
t=te+tcr1+···+tcrk−1
µse
−µstfe(te)µkcr
[ k∏
i=1
e−µcrtcri
]
dtdtcrk . . . dtcr1dte
=
∫ ∞
te=0
∫ ∞
tcr1=0
· · ·
∫ ∞
tcrk=0
e−µs(te+tcr1+···+tcrk−1 )
(1− e−µstcrk )fe(te)µkcr
[ k∏
i=1
e−µcrtcri
]
dtcrk . . . dtcr1dte
=
[ ∫ ∞
te=0
e−µstefe(te)dte
][
f∗cr(µs)
]k−1[
1− f∗cr(µs)
]
= f∗e (µs)
( µcr
µcr + µs
)k−1( µs
µcr + µs
)
. (7)
Again, according to the Excess Life Theorem [29], we have
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fe(t) = µcr
∫∞
τ=t
fcr(τ)dτ = µcre
−µcrt, and the Laplace-
Stieltjes transform of fe(t) is:
f∗e (µs) =
µcr
µcr + µs
. (8)
From Eq. (8), Eq. (7) is rewritten as:
Pr{K = k|Ts = ts} = µs
µcr + µs
( µcr
µcr + µs
)k
, for k ≥ 1.
(9)
Next, we discuss the special case K = 0, i.e., UE finishes the
session without performing handover. Pr{K = 0|Ts = ts}
can be derived as:
Pr{K = 0|Ts = ts}
= Pr{ts < te}
=
∫ ∞
te=0
∫ te
t=0
fs(t)fe(te)dtdte
= 1− µcr
µs
[
1− f∗cr(µs)
]
=
µs
µcr + µs
. (10)
Finally, Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) can be integrated together as:
Pr{K = k|Ts = ts} = µs
µcr + µs
( µcr
µcr + µs
)k
, for k ≥ 0.
(11)
According to Eqs. (6) and (11), Eq. (5) is rewritten as:
pc =
∞∑
k=0
Pr{K = k|Ts = ts} · pks
=
µs
µcr + µs
∞∑
k=0
pks
( µcr
µcr + µs
)k
=
µs
µcr + µs
· 1
1− ps
(
µcr
µcr+µs
)
=
µs
µs + µcr(1− pX2)
[
1−
(
kµb
kµb+λr
)k] .
Thus, the eMBMS session failure probability, pnc, that a
UE service session encounters handover failure(s) caused by
S1-based handover (without X2 interface) is:
pnc = 1− pc =
µcr(1− pX2)
[
1−
(
kµb
kµb+λr
)k]
µs + µcr(1− pX2)
[
1−
(
kµb
kµb+λr
)k] .
C. Modeling of Average UE Service Time
The UE service time, Tf , is defined as the time between
a UE joining the service and the time the UE forced to
be terminated due to handover failures. E[Tf ] is its mean
value. Increasing E[Tf ] increases the probability that UEs in
the network can enjoy eMBMS service long enough before
encountering a handover failure. For example, if a cellular
operator knows that the staying time of its major eMBMS
subscribers (say 90%) is less than one hour, the operator
may try to improve its network for E[Tf ] ≥ 3600s, which
guarantees that 90% users can complete their service session
successfully.
Next, we will derive E[Tf ]. Let K be the number of
handovers within the UE’s eMBMS session and I be the
number that a UE crosses cells between two handover failures.
Therefore,
Tf =
{
te, I = 1,
te + tcr1 + · · ·+ tcrI−1 , 2 ≤ I ≤ K.
Both the numbers that a UE crosses cells during its session
K and the session holding time Ts are independent of the cell
residence time. Moreover, te, tcrn , n ∈ {1, · · · , i − 1} are
independent of each other. That is,
E[te + tcr1 + · · · tcri−1 |I = i]
= E[te] + E[tcr1 ] + E[tcr2 ] + · · ·+ E[tcri−1 ]
=
∫ ∞
te=0
tefe(te)dte + (i− 1)
∫ ∞
tcr
tcrfcr(tcr)dtcr
=
∫ ∞
te=0
teµcre
−µcrtedte + (i− 1)
∫ ∞
tcr
tcrµcre
−µcrtcrdtcr
=
i
µcr
, 1 ≤ i . (12)
Furthermore, Pr{I = i} is the probability that a UE
encounters the first handover failure at its ith handover. That
means previous i − 1 handovers are all successful. We then
can derive Pr{I = i} as:
Pr{I = i} = pi−1s (1− ps), 1 ≤ i . (13)
According to Eqs. (12) and (13), the average UE service
time is derived as:
E[Tf ] =
∞∑
i=1
E[Tf |I = i]Pr{I = i}
=
∞∑
i=1
E[te + tcr1 + · · ·+ tcri−1 |I = i]Pr{I = i}
=
∞∑
i=1
i
µcr
· pi−1s (1− ps)
=
1
µcr
[
1−
(
kµb
kµb+λr
)k]
(1− pX2)
. (14)
D. Modeling of Extra Authentication Loads for UE and CN
Extra authentication load is defined as the authentication
load caused by handover failures. When a UE suffers from
handover failures due to rekeying, as shown in Fig. 2, the
UE needs to conduct User Service Join procedure Step 1 -
Step 5, which incur extra signaling cost for both UE and
CN. Also, if a UE suffers from three handover failures within
its session, the UE needs to conduct authentication procedure
three times to complete the session. We use E[CReAuth UE ]
and E[CReAuth core] to denote the extra authentication loads
for UE and CN, respectively. We derive them as follows:
E[CReAuth UE ]
=
E[Ts]
E[Tf ]
=
µcr
µs
[
1−
( kµb
kµb + λr
)k]
(1− pX2), (15)
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY, VOL. XX, NO. XX, XXX 2018 9
and
E[CReAuth core]
= E[NO. of UEs in system]E[CReAuth UE per second]
= λs · 1
µs
· E[CReAuth UE ] · µs
=
λsµcr
µs
[
1−
( kµb
kµb + λr
)k]
(1− pX2). (16)
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The analytical results in Section VI are validated by
extensive simulations by using ns-2, version 2.35 [31]. The
ns-2 simulator is used to define the motion mode of the UEs,
to simulate the handover behaviors using S1 interface and
X2 interface, to configure eNBs and UEs, and to create the
statistical data track log files. The simulation experiments
are generated and simulated on an Intel Core i7 3.9 GHz
machine using 8 GB RAM, Ubuntu 12.04 LTS.
Stochastic parameters are involved in the simulations
and are summarized in Table 1. If not further specified,
the following parameters are set as the default values for
performance comparison: 1µs = 3600 s,
1
µcr
= 60 s, 1µb = 0.5
s, pX2 = 50%, and λs = 5 (1/s). Here we show an example
in the simulations. During a session holding time ts, a UE
will visit K cells (with cell residence time tcri in i
th cell).
The UE’s eMBMS session holding time ts and cell residence
time tcr are assumed to be exponential distributed. With the
stochastic parameters ts and tcri , the number of handovers
during the UE’s session time, K, is different from time
to time. Also, the data buffer time at current serving eNB
tb is relaxed as general distribution by considering traffic
conditions.
The simulation results are the average over 100,000 simu-
lations. In general, the simulation results fit to the analytical
results. Due to the page limit, in the following figures we only
show the results with respect to Gamma distribution. Another
reason is that the distribution of any positive random variable
can be approximated by a combination of Gamma distribution
as stated in Lemma 3.9 in [30]. Moreover, in the figures,
the lines denote analytical results, and the points represent
simulation results.
A. Impacts of S1 and X2 Interfaces on eMBMS Handover
Failure Probability
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show the impacts of S1/X2 interface
and data buffered time on handover failure probability pf
and ph. Recall that pf is the handover failure probability
in the network when only S1 interface is deployed, whereas
ph denotes the handover failure probability considering the
impacts of X2 interface. The results are compared with 1µb ,
the mean value of data buffered time tb in the source eNB for
different network conditions (i.e., signal strength). We observe
that reducing tb (i.e., improve network condition) has positive
impacts on both pf and ph. We also observe that the variation
of pf and ph is not linear and is much slower than the changing
of 1µb when we double the value of
1
µb
from 0.3 s to 0.6 s
(or 0.6 s to 1.2 s). Therefore, improving network condition to
good signal strength is helpful to both pf and ph. However, it
may not be cost effective.
Next, we further investigate the impacts of S1 interface and
X2 interface on handover failure probability. Fig. 10(A) shows
pf , the handover failure probability using S1 interface, and
Fig. 10(B) illustrates ph, the handover failure probability using
X2 interface. It is easy to see that X2-based handover has
much lower handover failure probability compared with S1-
based handover. Specifically, we compare both pf and ph with
different UE arrival rate λs. Initially, we set λs as 1 arrival/s
and slowly increased it to 10 arrival/s. We observe that both
pf and ph increases significantly at the beginning (i.e., λs
from 1 arrival/s to 5 arrival/s) and increases slightly afterwards.
The reason is that increasing rekeying rate may lead to loss
of rekeying information in the buffer of the source eNB.
When the rekeying operation occurs frequently, the rekeying
information are more likely to be in the buffer of the source
eNB while a UE hands over to its target eNB. The results
validate our analytical models and discussions that reducing
λs decreases pf . Moreover, the results of Fig. 10(A) suggest
that decreasing λs from 10 arrival/s to 5 arrival/s almost does
not help to diminish the impacts of S1 interface on pf . In other
words, cellular operators are suggested to decrease λs down to
be less than 5 arrival/s for the improvement on pf . The results
also give optimization guidelines for our proposed solutions
which will be presented in Section VIII. In addition, Fig. 10(B)
also shows that ph is always less than 1−pX2, regardless either
network condition or UE arrival rate, or both. These suggest
cellular operators that adding X2 interface in the network is
more efficient than improving network condition on ph.
Fig. 11 shows the impacts of X2 interface on ph. The figure
indicates that handover failure probability, ph, can be down to
0% when X2 interfaces are deployed in the whole network. In
addition, when we increase the X2 interface probability, the
ph decreases when pX2 increases. We also see that when pX2
grows from 0% to 50%, the pf drops by 35.3% and 18.7%
with 1/µb = 1.2 s and 1/µb = 0.3 s, respectively. This reflects
that the existence of X2 interfaces has greater impact than
improving network condition. Furthermore, cellular operators
are suggested to replace S1 interface with X2 interface in the
networks if network condition is poor.
These results suggest cellular operators that adding X2
interface in the network is more efficient than improving
network condition on ph. Furthermore, cellular operators are
suggested to replace S1 interface with X2 interface in the
networks if network condition is poor.
B. Impacts of S1 and X2 Interfaces on eMBMS Session Failure
Probability
Fig. 12 shows the impacts of mean value of session life
time 1µs , X2 existing probability pX2, mean value of data
buffered time 1µb , rekeying time interval tI , and mean value
of cell residence time 1µcr on session failure probability pnc,
respectively. We first take a look at 1µs . We can see that large
value of 1µs (3600 s) leads to higher pnc than smaller
1
µs
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Fig. 10: Handover failure probability of S1-based handover and that of X2-based handover versus UE arrival rate to a specific
MBMS user service. Note that the unit of 1/µb is second.
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Fig. 11: eMBMS handover failure probability versus existing
probability of X2 interface. Note that the unit of 1/µb is
second.
does. The reason is that long session life time means UEs
suffering from more handover failures. Therefore, it results in
more session failure. An interesting observation in Figs. 12(C)
and 12(D) is that long session life time leads to considerable
raise of pnc, if tI and 1µcr are in small values (between 60 s and
180 s). These results indicate that long session life time is very
sensitive to tI and 1µcr . Therefore, to guarantee users’ QoE,
cellular operators are suggested to reduce rekeying rate in the
areas with high UE mobility and for the eMBMS services with
long session life time.
More specifically, Figs. 12(A) and 12(B) illustrate the im-
pact of pX2 and 1µb on pnc, respectively. Similar to the results
in Fig. 11, increasing X2 interface and improving network
condition have positive impacts on pnc. This is due to the
fact that less handover failures make the session more likely
to be successfully completed. Furthermore, the impacts of tI
and 1µcr are shown in Figs. 12(C) and 12(D). We observe that
pnc declines significantly when either tI or 1µcr increases from
60 s to 180 s, and then the curves descent slowly afterwards.
Based on the results, our suggestions to cellular operators are
twofold: (1) Increasing tI to a suitable value can find a balance
point to guarantee both users’ QoE and the interest of the
content providers. For example, tI = 60 s for 1µs = 600 s, or,
tI = 120 s for 1µs = 3600 s. Large tI may hurt the interest
of the content provider (revenue loss), whereas small one may
result in the deterioration of users’ QoE. (2) Deploying X2
interface does not make significant improvement on pnc in the
areas with low UE mobility (e.g., 1µcr ≥ 300 s). The operators
are not suggested to deploy X2 interface in those areas if they
care about the deployment cost of X2 interface.
C. Impacts of S1 and X2 Interfaces on Average UE Service
Time
In this section, we study the average UE service time, E[Tf ],
versus X2 interface existing probability, pX2, as shown in
Figs. 13(A)-(C). We scale pX2 from 0% to 90% and observe
that E[Tf ] increases exponentially when pX2 grows. One
interesting observation is that E[Tf ] increases very slowly
when pX2 is less than 40%, but grows significantly after 40%.
This tells operators that although adding X2 interface into
legacy network inceases E[Tf ], deploying X2 interfaces makes
nearly no difference to QoE if pX2 ≤ 40%.
More specifically, Fig. 13(A) illustrates both the analytical
and simulation results of E[Tf ] by considering the mean value
of cell residence time, 1µcr , with respect to 60 s, 120 s, and
240 s, respectively. We can see that longer cell residence time
results in larger E[Tf ]. In other words, high mobility UEs are
more likely to suffer from handover failure. Therefore, legacy
networks serving high mobility UEs are suggested to increase
X2 interface probability. For example, the eNBs near freeways
are recommended to deploy X2 interface. Fig. 13(B) shows the
impacts of data buffered time 1µb on E[Tf ]. In the simulations,
we adjusted 1µb from 0.3 s to 1.2 s. The results show that it has
less effects on E[Tf ] compared with 1µcr . Fig. 13(C) depicts
that high UE arrival rate λs reduces E[Tf ] slightly.
In conclusion, in the above parameters, pX2 has the most
considerable impacts on E[Tf ]. By adding X2 interface into
legacy networks, E[Tf ] can be significantly improved. If the
deployment cost of X2 interface matters, we suggest operators
deploy X2 interface in the area with high mobility UEs (e.g.,
near freeways, railways) and increase X2 interface to at least
40%.
D. Impacts of S1 and X2 Interfaces on Extra Authentication
Load for UE and CN
Figs. 14(A)-(D) illustrate the average number of re-
authentication procedures that a UE needs to perform if it
wants to complete its eMBMS session. The figure shows
that E[CReAuth UE ] decreases when pX2 increases. That is,
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. Note that the unit of 1/µs is second.
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Fig. 13: Average time between two successive handover failures versus existing probability of X2 interface with different 1µcr ,
1
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increasing X2 interfaces does help a UE to reduce its extra
authentication load.
In particular, we further investigate the extra authentication
load for UE, E[CReAuth UE ], by considering average session
time in Fig. 14(A), average cell residence in Fig. 14(B),
average data buffered time in Fig. 14(C), and UE arrival rate
in Fig. 14(D). Figs. 14(A) and 14(B) are similar, where we
adjust either 1µs or
1
µcr
by doubling its value from time to
time. We observe that the curves of either 1µs or
1
µcr
are
linear. Whereas, in Figs. 14(C) and 14(D), we can see that
the growths of both 1µb and λs only lead to slight gains
of E[CReAuth UE ]. One interesting observation is that the
authentication load rises almost 20% by doubling λs from
2 (1/s) to 4 (1/s), compared with only 10% gains when λs is
further doubled from 4 (1/s) to 8 (1/s). This indicates that λs
has less and less impact on E[CReAuth UE ] when it increases.
Similar observations are also found for the impacts of data
buffered time on E[CReAuth UE ], which means that operators
only need to keep network condition on a certain level. Also,
it will not give much help on reducing E[CReAuth UE ] if the
network condition already exceeds the level.
Furthermore, Figs. 15(A)-(D) shows the extra authentication
load for CN, E[CReAuth core], by considering average session
time in Fig. 15(A), average cell residence time in Fig. 15(B),
average data buffered time in Fig. 15(C), and UE arrival rate
in Fig. 15(D). Similar to Figs. 14(A)-(C), Figs. 15(A)-(C)
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(B), (C) and (D), respectively. Note that the units of 1/µs, 1/µcr, and 1/µb are second. The unit of λs is arrival/s.
also demonstrate that the growth of X2 interface probability
diminishes E[CReAuth core] significantly, and that decreasing
one of 1µs ,
1
µcr
, or 1µb reduces the authentication overhead
for CN. Differing from Fig. 14, the results shown in Fig. 15
illustrate that the increment of λs leads to considerable growth
of E[CReAuth core]. The reason is that the more UEs joining
the service, the more UE session failures.
In conclusion, in UE’s side, λs has less impacts on
E[CReAuth UE ] because the handover failure probability ap-
proaches to 1 − pX2 even when λs approaches to infinite.
However, in CN side, µb has less impact. The reason is that
the average number of UEs staying in the eMBMS session
becomes dominant to the E[CReAuth core].
VIII. GUIDELINES FOR OPERATORS
In the above two sections, we provide a systematic way
to investigate the handover failure problem in eMBMS. We
have derived and discussed five performance metrics: han-
dover failure probability ph, session failure probability pnc,
average UE service time E[Tf ], and extra authentication cost
(E[CReAuth UE ] and E[CReAuth core]). Based on them, we
conclude that cellular operators can improve the network
performance by adjusting any (or all) of the parameters.
In this section, we first use a case study to show that system
performance can be significantly improved by changing one of
the parameters, where we use rekeying rate as an alternative
for X2 in the areas with low UE mobility. Next, evaluation of
the proposed solution is discussed, followed by our guidelines
for operators.
A. A Solution: Dynamic Rekeying Interval
Considering a scenario that Facebook Live is going to take
place, there might be bursty UE arrivals for the eMBMS
service. In order to provide forward security in the service, left
UEs should be revoked so that they cannot access the eMBMS
content encrypted by the new keys. Rekeying operations are
performed if a UE joins/leaves the eMBMS service (see
Section II-B). In such situation, rekeying rate will increase if
bursty UEs arrive, resulting in the surge of missing rekeying
information. The performance can be improved if we can
reduce rekeying rate.
There are some ways to reduce rekeying rate. In [16], we
proposed to prolong rekeying interval dynamically. Although
increasing rekeying interval is a straightforward approach to
reduce rekeying rate, it is not intuitive when the interests of
content providers are taken into consideration. In eMBMS
service, the content providers charge for the multimedia con-
tent they provide. Prolonging rekeying interval means that
left UEs are still able to access eMBMS content, resulting
in revenue loss for the content providers. Here comes with
the tradeoff between the cellular network operators and the
content providers. Interested readers can refer to our recent
work in [16]. In this paper, however, we mainly focus on the
impacts of prolong rekeying interval dynamically from cellular
operators’ perspective (i.e., reducing authentication costs for
CN and UE).
We denote the prolonged rekeying interval as tI l and the
time interval between the UE hands over to the next eNB and
the first rekeying operation occurs as tr l. Next, to investigate
the impact of the prolonged rekeying interval, we model the
handover failure probability with tr l as follows.
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Fig. 16: Impacts of prolonging rekeying time interval on extra authentication load for UE. Note that the unit of 1/µs is second.
The probability that rekeying information is not included in
the buffered data of the serving eNB when the UE hands over
to its target eNB is:
Pr{tb ≤ tr l}
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr{tb ≤ tr l|tr l = t}fr l(t)dt
=
∫ tI l
t=0
Pr{tb ≤ t|tr l = t}fr l(t)dt
(since 0 ≤ tr l < tI l)
=
∫ tI l
t=0
∫ t
tb=0
fb(tb)fr l(t)dtbdt, (17)
where fr l(t) is the pdf of tr l.
As aforementioned discussion, the rekeying interval be-
comes deterministically distributed in steady state with the
rekeying rate 1tI l . According to the Excess Life Theorem [29],
we have:
fr l(t) =
1
tI l
∫ ∞
s=t
fI l(s)ds =
1
tI l
[
1− FI l(t)
]
. (18)
The rekeying operation has a pmf (probability mass function)
given by: pI l(m) = tI lts , m ∈ N0,m ∈
[
0,
⌊
ts
tI l
⌋)
. Its CDF
is then given as:
FI l(t) =
{
m
ts
tI l, mtI l ≤ t < (m+ 1)tI l;
1,
⌊
ts
tI l
⌋
tI l ≤ t < ts;
(19)
where m ∈ N0, m ∈
[
0,
⌊
ts
tI l
⌋)
. Therefore, from
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Eqs. (18) and (19), Eq. (17) is rewritten as:
Pr{tb ≤ tr l}
=
∫ tI l
t=0
∫ t
tb=0
fb(tb)
1
tI l
[
1− FI l(t)
]
dtbdt
=
1
tI l
∫ tI l
tb=0
∫ tI l
t=tb
fb(tb)
[
1− FI l(t)
]
dtdtb
=
1
tI l
∫ tI l
tb=0
∫ tI l
t=tb
fb(tb)dtdtb(
by FI l(t) = 0, if 0 ≤ t < tI l
)
=
1
tI l
∫ tI l
tb=0
fb(tb)(tI l − tb)dtb
=
∫ tI l
tb=0
fb(tb)dtb − 1
tI l
∫ tI l
tb=0
fb(tb)tbdtb
= Fb(tI l)− Fb(tI l) + 1
tI l
∫ tI l
tb=0
Fb(tb)dtb
=
1
tI l
∫ tI l
tb=0
Fb(tb)dtb. (20)
Hence, Eq. (2) is then rewritten as:
pf l = 1− 1
tI l
∫ tI l
tb=0
Fb(tb)dtb. (21)
In the following, pf l is shown based on the distribution
of buffered data time, tb, with Gamma distribution, Erlang
distribution, and exponential distribution, respectively.
Gamma Distribution: The CDF of Gamma distribution,
Gamma(k, 1kµb ), is Fb(tb) =
1
Γ(k)γ(k, kµbtb). Hence, Eq. (21)
is rewritten as: pf l = 1− 1tI l
∫ tI l
tb=0
1
Γ(k)γ(k, kµbtb)dtb.
Erlang Distribution: The CDF of Erlang distribution,
Erlang(k, µb), is Fb(tb) = 1 −
∑k−1
n=0
1
n!e
−µbtb(µbtb)n.
Hence, Eq. (21) is rewritten as: pf l =
1
tI l
∫ tI l
tb=0
∑k−1
n=0
1
n!e
−µbtb(µbtb)ndtb.
Exponential Distribution: The CDF of Exponential distri-
bution, Exp(µb), is Fb(tb) = 1 − e−µbtb . Hence, Eq. (21) is
rewritten as: pf l = 1−e
−µbtI l
µbtI l
.
B. Evaluation of the Proposed Solution
As aforementioned discussion, if operators cannot deploy
X2 interface due to various reasons, we still can deal with the
bursty UE arrivals by adjusting rekeying rate. Accordingly,
a solution is proposed. Figs. 16(A)-(B) and Figs. 17(A)-(B)
show the simulation and analytical results of the solution on
UE and CN, respectively. In the figures, the results with and
without our proposed dynamic rekeying are shown in (A) and
(B), respectively. We can see that the extra authentication costs
of both UE and CN decline significantly. We also observe
that in Fig. 16(B) and Fig. 17(B), the extra authentication
costs initially drop sharply and then start to descent smoothly.
Because a long rekeying interval results in revenue loss for
content providers [16], mobile operators can choose appropri-
ate rekeying intervals to alleviate authentication load for both
UE and CN based on their closed-forms derived in Eqs. (15),
(16).
C. Guidelines
Here, we offer general guidelines for operators. Operators
can obtain specific settings by using our analytical models in
Section VI.
1) X2 interface existing probability pX2: It is not necessary
to deploy X2 interface in the whole network. Operators
can only replace S1 interface with X2 interface in part
of their networks.
2) Data buffered time tb in a serving eNB: The data
buffered time is closely related to network condi-
tion. Generally, good signal strength leads to less data
buffered in the serving eNB. The operators can improve
their network condition to guarantee good signal strength
to reduce tb.
3) Rekeying rate λr: Compared with the above two parame-
ters which are costly and time consuming to improve, the
rekeying rate λr is the only parameter that the operators
can adjust in real time to improve performance.
Due to cost concerns, we suggest that cellular operators
deploy X2 interface and improve network condition in the
areas in which UEs have short cell residence time tcr (i.e., UEs
with high moving speed). In those areas, such as high-speed
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railways, freeways, highways, UEs may need to handover
from one eNB to another frequently. Either deploying X2
interface or improving signal strength can reduce handover
failure probability significantly. In other areas (i.e., networks
are not fully deployed with X2 interface), adjusting rekeying
rate is a flexible approach to handle bursty UE arrivals.
IX. SUMMARY
In this paper, we identify a new eMBMS handover failure
problem caused by KMM when there is only S1 interface
available in eMBMS. We then propose comprehensive an-
alytical models to investigate the problem. We model five
performance metrics to study the network performance, i.e.,
eMBMS handover failure probability, eMBMS session failure
probability, average UE service time, extra authentication
loads for UE, and extra authentication loads for CN. Our
analytical models reveal the common properties of the han-
dover failure in eMBMS and its relation to network per-
formance. Furthermore, based on the analytical models and
simulation results, we conclude that the existing probability
of X2 interface, data buffered time in the serving eNB, and
rekeying rate can be adjusted to diminish the impacts of the
handover failure. Accordingly, we propose a solution to handle
bursty UE arrivals. Both the simulation and analytical results
demonstrate that the impacts of the eMBMS handover failure
are reduced significantly.
In this paper, we present a systematic way to investigate
the handover failure problem in eMBMS. We also provide
theoretical guidelines for operators to design and optimize
their networks. In order to reduce deployment cost, we suggest
operators deploy X2 interface and improve network condition
in the areas in which UEs have short cell residence time (i.e.,
UEs with high moving speed). For the other areas, we suggest
adjusting rekeying rate as a flexible approach to handle bursty
UE arrivals. The impacts of rekeying rate can be found in our
recent work [16].
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